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Abstract
US-led construction projects in Afghanistan have performed poorly on average; indeed, it
is the norm to deliver projects late to need and over budget to the customer. Using a
dataset of 25 Afghan wartime projects, two separate, yet related questions relating to
these DoD construction activities in the Afghan theater of operations were investigated.
These questions are: 1) What factors affect the success of construction projects; and 2)
How do project outcomes differ based on the contract type? First, with regards to critical
success factors, current literature suggests that wartime projects may face the same cost
and schedule factors as peacetime projects, with some notable additions. Using
peacetime factors as a baseline, project factors, health and safety compliance, quality of
work, technical performance, work productivity, and external environmental factors were
tested with contingency tables to determine if they are predictive of schedule or cost
performance. External environmental factors, including weather and wartime security,
were not predictive of project performance. However, cost performance and schedule
performance was found to be significantly dependent on government-issued excusable
delays. Moreover, project management deficiencies were predictive of poor schedule
performance but not cost performance. Second with regards to contract type, as the
Afghan security condition was volatile, contracting officers dynamically used both
reimbursable and fixed-price contracts in order to accomplish the mission. Using the
Mann-Whitney tests, performance differences between contract types were explored.
Reimbursable contracts were found to have significantly greater cost and
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schedule growth. Additionally, fixed price projects were found to have more problems
with design performance and contract management. There was no significant difference
in overall project quality. In conclusion, cost monitoring from the owner and scrutiny of
project management is critical to the success of reimbursable contracts, and technical
performance monitoring is necessary to ensure that fixed-price projects meet deadlines.
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To every construction engineer, project manager, and government representative who
tries to do good when there is so much bad: This is for you. Keep fighting the good fight.
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ANALYSIS OF AIR FORCE WARTIME CONTRACTED CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT PERFORMANCE

I. Introduction
Background
Military construction is a critical support element to the establishment of a
national defense system. Unfortunately, these construction projects are not immune to
challenges, delays, and cost overruns, particularly in wartime construction environments.
From the beginning of the nation-building effort, Afghanistan construction projects
construction challenges and failure occur so frequently that they have become expectedly
commonplace. Of the $100 billion allocated to the project by June 2014, $23.1 billion
had been allocated for construction projects. The Departments of Defense and State have
been responsible for the majority of the projects, and have most often utilized the Air
Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC, and formerly known as the Air Force Center for
Engineering and the Environment, or AFCEE) and the United States Corps of Engineers
(USACE) as construction agents (Thibault, 2011). In 2007, AFCEC became a key
construction agent for the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), and the
program is still in operation as of March 2015. As the client and recipient for this
research, they wish to gain “lessons learned” that may benefit future projects, whether in
Afghanistan or a different wartime location. This introduction provides a background of
the problem for investigation, explains the sponsor’s need for the research, and finishes
with a brief description of the scope and methodology for the paper.
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The AFCEC program, though comparatively small in number of projects when
compared with USACE, comprised a significant portion of the monetary allocation for
construction. The program executed nearly $3 billion in construction from 2007 to 2014.
The program used a heavy equipment repair and construction (HERC) contract, which
consisted of multiple pre-approved contractors. Unlike local contractors, commonly used
by USACE, these HERC contractors were large construction companies with significant
financial resources. The HERC contract served as a competitive indefinite delivery
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. The individual projects were tendered by AFCEC as
task orders (although, in the remainder of this thesis, projects are also referred to as
contracts). Much like USACE, the AFCEC program experienced significant challenges in
cost and schedule growth, but their HERC model was also heralded as a program that had
(until 2013) never terminated a contractor for default.
Thus far, there is little research that provides insight into wartime construction
challenges, including Afghanistan. Two studies have been performed analyzing
construction challenges in Afghanistan. The first was sponsored by USACE and
performed by Affleck et al. (2011) who surveyed construction personnel on the most
common challenges. The second was another AFIT thesis by Jaszkowiak (2012) which
analyzed USACE and AFCEC projects to find performance differences between firm
fixed price (FFP) contracts and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts (CPFF) using some
quantitative data, but primarily personnel surveys. The results of these two research
projects provide some insight, but many questions remain regarding causes of poor
project performance, as well as performance differences between contract types.
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Therefore, AFCEC has commissioned this thesis to gain further knowledge of
construction difficulties on projects in Afghanistan. This thesis seeks to build upon the
two previous research efforts for a more in-depth data analysis on 25 AFCEC
construction projects.
Problem Statement
It has historically been very difficult to execute construction projects in wartime
environments, and Afghanistan has been no exception to this trend. The AFCEC
contracting system has used both FFP and CPFF contracts to execute projects, and both
contract types have experienced severe difficulties. There are many factors and root
causes from from which construction challenges can originate. However, there may also
be predictive performance factors that will help project managers anticipate or overcome
construction challenges. Moreover, there may also be performance differences in
different contract types that will provide focus areas for government officials when
auditing project progress. However, there is little knowledge of what these factors are in
wartime construction projects. As such, there is not a consistent framework for
government managers to scrutinize contractors in order to control costs and schedule.
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses
The objective of this thesis is to understand which factors may be predictive of the
construction budget and schedule performance in wartime projects. Additionally, it seeks
to find significant performance differences between reimbursable and fixed price
contracts. There are many performance metrics, such as cost, schedule, and quality. The
literature review will provide guidance for performance measures by which these
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challenges and differences can be analyzed. To answer these questions, this thesis uses
the following major factors: Project Factors, Health and Safety, Quality, Technical
Performance, and Productivity, and External Environmental Factors in wartime
construction projects. Therefore, we seek to answer the following questions in the form
of two scholarly articles:
1) Which factors affect the success of wartime construction projects?
2) How do wartime project outcomes differ based on the contract type?
Scope and Methodology
The in-depth data gathering is comprised of two primary investigations for each
project. The first portion analyzes the invoicing and schedule history of the project to
gain a thorough understands of all cost and schedule growth. The second portion surveys
the daily reports for the projects during their respective courses of construction and
identifies all major deficiencies. This deficiency data will be summarized and sorted into
categories. These are the factor groups by which statistical analysis of project
performance can be performed.
The primary methods for statistical analysis of the data will be the contingency
table (for Article 1) and the Mann-Whitney comparison of medians (for Article 2). It is
not necessary to include detailed steps related to statistical methods in scholarly articles
because it is assumed that readers of scholarly journals have some general understanding
of the methodologies. Therefore, a slightly more detailed explanation of the methodology
is contained in Chapter 5.
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Significance
There is almost very little research that captures mistakes and challenges in the
Iraq wartime construction effort. Unfortunately, many of the same mistakes were
repeated in the Afghanistan reconstruction effort. Improved knowledge of construction
performance gives government officials better tools for decision-making and negotiating
with contractors. This research will ideally precede an increased effort by US government
agencies to seek out root causes of construction struggles in order to improve
management and oversight for future projects.
Preview
This thesis uses the scholarly article format. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are the
articles produced from the research. They are both being prepared for submission to the
following journals: Journal of Construction Engineering Management and Construction
Management and Economics. The two articles will comprise the body of this thesis and
contain the elements of research in the layout as per the journal submission requirements.
They individually contain their own abstract, introduction, literature review,
methodology, results, discussion, and conclusion. Chapter 4 contains additional
discussion of the research methodology and results. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the
research effort, as well as findings and future research not discussed in the bodies of the
articles themselves.
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II. Scholarly Article 1: The influence of project and performance factors on
construction performance: A wartime perspective
Ryan M. Hoff; Gregory D. Hammond, Ph.D., P.E.; Peter P. Feng, Ph.D., P.E.; Edward D.
White, Ph.D
Abstract
US-led construction projects in Afghanistan have performed poorly on-average;
indeed, it is the norm to deliver projects late to need and over budget to the customer.
Using a dataset of 25 Afghan wartime projects, we seek to find factors that affect the
success of construction projects. Current literature suggests that wartime projects may
face the same cost and schedule factors as peacetime projects, with some notable
additions. Using peacetime factors as a baseline, project factors, health and safety
compliance, quality of work, technical performance, work productivity, and external
environmental factors were tested with contingency tables to determine if they are
predictive of schedule or cost performance. We found that external environmental
factors, to include weather and wartime security, were not predictive of project
performance. However, cost performance and schedule performance was found to be
significantly dependent on government-issued excusable delays. Moreover, project
management deficiencies were predictive of poor schedule performance but not cost
performance.
Introduction
The construction industry uses three primary, interrelated performance metrics to
measure project performance: cost, quality, and time (Chan, et al., 2002). All three of
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these metrics are interrelated. For example, poor schedule performance in construction
can be a result of poor quality, thus requiring rework, which drives cost increases.
Reichelt and Lyneis’ systems dynamics model found the relationship between project
management, quality, work to be done, and rework, to be a very dynamic feedback
process, containing many complex variables. Additionally, they found that increased
pressure on a constructor to finish a project quickly creates positive and negative
reactions (Reichelt & Lyneis, 1999). Similarly, Flyvbjerg also found that cost growth is
dependent on schedule growth (2004). Even though the same potential for schedule and
budget overruns exists on all projects, there is significant variance in the ultimate
outcomes for each project. While this variance impedes the identification of global
factors that influence cost, quality, and time (Reichelt & Lyneis, 1999) it is still possible
for other researchers to perform identify factors within local jurisdictions. In general, the
most cited causes of delay are engineering/design, external environmental factors, labor,
material quality or material availability, project management, subcontractors, and weather
(Al-Momani, 2000; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Mansfield, et al., 1994; Marzouk & ElRasas, 2014). These researchers have concluded that the initial risk of delay in a
construction project is high, regardless of additional factors. However, when construction
projects are executed in environments where risk factors are at a heightened state, such as
Afghanistan, the schedule delay risk increases dramatically. (Affleck, et al., 2011;
Kremers, et al., 2010)
As of June 2014, the United States (US) had spent nearly $100 billion on the
rebuilding effort in Afghanistan, and had allocated $23.1 billion specifically for
construction projects (GAO, 2014). The Department of State and the Department of
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Defense (DoD) have managed the majority of construction in Afghanistan. The two
primary construction agents are the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) and the
United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) (Thibault, 2011).
Although it has long been established that Afghanistan projects have performed
quite poorly on average (Thibault, 2011), there is neither research on primary causes of
severe schedule delays for AFCEC projects nor quantitative research on wartime
construction delays or budget problems. One of the largest operational differences
between AFCEC and USACE is that AFCEC uses an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite
Quantity (IDIQ) contract with a pre-approved list of Western-owned prime contractors
that have exclusive access to projects that are advertised from AFCEC. These prime
contractors are then incentivized to hire local-national subcontractors in Afghanistan. In
contract, USACE uses a firm fixed price (FFP) lowest-price technically acceptable
competitive bidding system. Historically, USACE has been forced to terminate many
failing projects, while, as of January 2015, AFCEC has only been forced to terminate one
contract. Despite this high rate of project completion, AFCEC projects still experience
high schedule and cost overruns. As previously stated, there are many factors that affect
the performance of a project: project management, procurement, external environment,
procurement procedures, human-related factors, and project-related factors (e.g. scope,
size) (Chan, et al., 2004). Currently, it is not known which factors play the largest role in
the time delay of completion, especially in wartime construction projects. Therefore in
this paper, we seek to understand how predictive of schedule or cost are project factors,
health and safety, quality, technical performance, productivity, and external
environmental factors in wartime construction projects? The factors listed in the research
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question were chosen because they are most appropriate for a quantitative evaluation of
project performance. Other factors are more appropriately evaluated through qualitative
analysis and surveys.
A small amount of research has been performed on construction challenges in
Afghanistan; and most of it comes from government oversight agencies. The United
States government provided extensive oversight to the Afghanistan reconstruction effort.
Auditing agencies were the Commission on Wartime Contracting, Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and many others. This “in-house” oversight has served to reveal many of the
setbacks and problem areas within the reconstruction; however none of the research has
attempted to predict how these problems may be anticipated in the future. Thus far,
SIGAR has published a number of case studies on specific projects that reveal mistakes
and problems, but very little cause-effect analysis has been performed, and none of it has
been quantitative.
Additionally, very little research has been conducted to understand the root causes
of delays in US-funded Afghan construction. In 2010, USACE released a qualitative
report on their managed projects in Afghanistan that drew upon interviews with their
construction management team. Using interviews, Jaszkowiak (2012) investigated
differences between AFCEC Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) and Firm-Fixed Price (FFP)
contracts in Afghanistan. However, no quantitative research has been performed, for
either USACE or AFCEC, to investigate the causes of schedule delays in Afghan
projects. Studies modeling construction delays have already been performed in many
countries (Al-Momani, 2000; Flyvbjerg, et al., 2004; Halligan, et al., 1994; Hoffman, et
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al., 2007; Ng, et al., 2001; Reichelt & Lyneis, 1999; Skitmore & Ng, 2003); however,
predictive models from other regions and external environments may not exhibit the same
behavior of a wartime environment as Afghanistan.
The data for this research effort comes from the AFCEC construction program.
The data come primarily from the daily reports submitted to AFCEC by on-site Quality
Assurance (QA) engineers. These reports contain quality shortfalls that the QA’s
identified and reported to AFCEC. These reports contain many comments and
observations regarding deficiencies and other project problems that can be used in
statistical modeling, all of which ultimately may affect the progression of the project. The
many combinations of different problems that occur in Afghanistan projects may form
patterns which can be statistically shown to affect the schedule progress of the project.
Literature Review
The Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) has been responsible for over $2
Billion in construction for the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. Through the
course of the program, some projects performed well, and some projects performed
poorly. But through it all, one primary question has been asked: how does a project
manager recognize a quality project from a poor performing project? To this point, no
research has been done for wartime projects that attempt to predict schedule performance.
This research will use statistical tools to identify which factors are more closely
correlated with schedule performance of these wartime construction projects.
Researchers have used simple regression models to predict schedule and cost
performance in construction projects. An early model, developed by Bromilow (1969),
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using data from 309 Australian projects, predicted the construction time based on an
exponential model that included three factors: cost of the project in millions of dollars,
customer’s average time performance for a $1 million project, and a constant which
describes the relationship between time and cost. In a recent test of the Bromilow’s timecost (BTC) model on 856 U.S. Air Force facilities constructed from 1988 to 2004, the
model explained 37% of the variability. This is a notably high percentage, considering
the complex nature of construction projects, which tends to inflate the variance
(Hoffman, et al., 2007). Another study performed on a set of Australian projects further
confirmed the accuracy of the model (although the curve coefficient behavior
demonstrates a tendency to change with time and location) (Ng, et al., 2001). While
Bromilow’s model is not applicable to this research, it further confirms that there is a
strong relationship between schedule length and ultimate cost. This further emphasizes
the need for a model that can explain schedule length.
While Bomilow’s model may be useful for long-term costing for companies and
clients, research suggests that project management and project decisions may benefit
more from multivariate regression models. Russel and Zhai (1996) used multipleregression to predict contractor failure using economic and financial variables. The used
economic factors for input variables, such as interest, value of the work after
construction, and assets and working capital of the contractor. Their model successfully
classified 18 of 23 contractors, 13 of which had failed (Russell & Zhai, 1996).
Additionally, an Australian study performed by Skitmore and Ng (2003) used client
sector, contractor selection method, contractual arrangement, project type, contract
period, and contract ultimate cost to predict final cost of a set of residential projects. The
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challenge with this and Bromilow’s model is that the final cost must be estimated for the
project. Thal et al. (2010) used regression successfully to predict the final cost of 203
construction projects for the purposes of allocating contingency funds. The researchers
used normalized design length ratio, defined as the length of the design divided by the
cost of the design, as one of the primary input variables. Other predictive input variables
were the estimated and programmed costs respective to the actual cost awarded to the
contractor.
The literature review suggests that wartime projects face the same cost and
schedule factors as peacetime projects with some notable additions. A review of multiple
studies from other countries in surrounding regions shows that, while some minor causes
of schedule delays tend to vary depending on culture and geographic location, major
causes seem to hold constant across environments, namely: design problems, planning
problems, weather interference, unskilled workers/quality problems, and difficulty
working with the owner or lack of direction from the owner, and change orders or scope
changes (Mansfield, et al., 1994; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Ibbs, 2012; Marzouk & ElRasas, 2014; Olima & K'akumu, 1999). Specific to Afghanistan, USACE is the only
organization, thus far, that has published any researched causes for delay (Affleck, et al.,
2011). The researchers performed interviews and surveys with USACE personnel, as well
as local national personnel who were involved in the construction process, to gain insight
into key problems experienced during US-funded construction projects within
Afghanistan. As can be seen in Table 1, Affleck found both parallels and unique
conditions in Afghanistan relative to the broader literature review.
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Table 1 – Qualitative Construction Problem Comparison
Middle East
(Peacetime)

Cause of Delay
Security Problems (theft and attacks)

Afghanistan
X

Physical Environment (Weather, Terrain)

X

Cultural Environment

X
X

Economic Environment

X

X

Political Environment

X

X

Poor Design

X

X

Slow Design

X

Labor/Manpower Shortage

X

X

Quality of Work

X

X

Bidding System/Selection Process

X

Contractor Financial Problems

X

Material Supply Problems

X

Poor Owner Management

X

Poor Contractor Management

X

Corruption and Bribery

X

X

The USACE survey found that security concerns such as theft and attacks to be
the largest construction problem. It primarily occurred in the design and construction
phases of the projects, and had a direct impact on material supply problems (Affleck, et
al., 2011). This issue is not as prevalent in peacetime research. Berg, et al. (2005)
interviewed 102 individuals in the American construction industry in order to determine
average losses due to theft and vandalism on construction projects. Larger construction
companies suffered more instances of theft, and smaller construction companies suffered
more instances of vandalism. There was no significant trend to conclude that all
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companies experience significant losses due to theft or vandalism. Indeed, many
contractors do not seek claims for losses as they are below insurance deductibles. While
theft can be a potential problem for construction projects, its impact seems to be greater
in wartime than peacetime.
The physical environment is frequently cited in both Afghanistan and industry
literature. Afghanistan construction managers believed that there was often improper
planning for weather conditions on the part of the contractor. These weather conditions
ranged from heavy snow to heavy rain, and often were linked to the physical environment
or terrain in the vicinity (flooding was a common problem). Low temperatures in some
parts of the country were frequently cited (Affleck, et al., 2011). Industry research also
shows that weather is a commonly cited factor. However, little mention is made with
regard to weather planning; only poor weather at a greater frequency or severity than was
anticipated (Sweis, et al., 2008; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Chan, et al., 2004). Typical
construction contracts allow for severe weather as a noncompensable delay (Howell,
1982-1983), which grants additional time for the contractor to finish the project, but no
additional funding (Smith, Currie & Hancock, 2009; GSA, 1984). But there is no
difference in opinion on weather’s effect of wartime and non-wartime projects.
The next problem found by USACE was the incompatibility of western
requirements with the culture of Afghanistan. This incompatibility either rendered the
project useless to the end-user, or it required significant rework in both design and
construction phases. Frequent turnover of USACE personnel in and out of Afghanistan,
as well as jobsite safety, were also listed as significant problems (Affleck, et al., 2011).
While the cultural environment is briefly mentioned by Chan (2004) when discussing all
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factors that may affect a construction project, it typically is not mentioned as a significant
influence. Research has shown that cultural effects can have significant effects in
construction, especially when there are distinct cultural and ethnic differences between
the project management team and the indigenous population. Kremers found cultural
effect magnified construction problems in wartime projects. (Kremers, et al., 2010).
Pheng and Yuquan studied the Singaporean and Chinese construction industries, which
often are forced into cooperative situations. The cultural difference between people of the
two countries were significant, and in order to aid productivity, both groups were forced
to make significant changes and concessions (Pheng & Yuquan, 2002). Moreover, Baba
found significant cultural differences between western and eastern cultures construction
management techniques. (Baba, 1996). Additionally, a study of dispute resolution in
foreign-related Chinese projects found distinct differences between western cultures
methods of executing contracts and resolving problems; particularly in legal
matters(Chan, 1997). Therefore, while there is no specific evidence to highlight the effect
of cultural differences on project performance, related research suggests that cultural
differences may be a significant factor on project performance in wartime projects.
The bidding process has frequently been cited in the construction industry as a
primary cause of project problems. Simply put, the traditional policy of “lowest bid wins”
frequently results in the contractor underbidding. (Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Sweis, et al.,
2008) Consequently, Assaf and Al-Hejji have found associations between the bidding
process and the contractor’s financial problems. (Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006) Despite these
well-known behavior patterns seen in the construction industry, these problems were not
mentioned in the Afghan USACE report.
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Material supply problems were cited in the USACE study as a significant cause of
problems, namely due to the remote nature of Afghanistan itself. Quality materials are
difficult to acquire there, and usually need to be imported. (Affleck, et al., 2011) Industry
research does not make mention of this problem in association with frequent project
delays, which is logical, considering that Afghanistan is among the remotest and harshest
of construction environments.
Of the last two differences in Table 1, one was mentioned in industry literature,
and one mentioned in the USACE study. The first was poor project management, which
has been a focus of the construction industry for some time (Chan, et al., 2004; Sweis, et
al., 2008). However, it is interesting that the Afghanistan study made no mention of poor
project management from the contractor or government, which has been a notable
problem in the Afghanistan reconstruction effort for some time (Kremers, et al., 2010;
GAO, 2014; Thibault, 2011). The final difference, corruption and bribery, was mentioned
in the USACE study as well as by Kremers (2010), but not industry literature. This
problem is cultural in nature, and usually was tied to the either the local populace
surrounding the project, or the local governmental or military authority. Therefore, it
makes sense why this problem was not mentioned in the industry literature for more
developed and less war-torn countries. It will be important to consider this problem in
future reconstruction efforts, particularly due to the nature of war and how it affects
business ventures such as construction projects (Kremers, et al., 2010).
There is a small amount of research which attempts to predict construction budget
or schedule failure. A quantitative model by Russell & Jaselskis (1992) successfully
predicted construction failure in 15 of 17 failed projects. Additionally, it correctly
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predicted success in 16 of 19 successful projects. The predictive factors used were, owner
evaluation of the contractor, cost monitoring performed by the owner, contractor project
manager support by senior management, and early contractor project manager
involvement. They recommended that owners develop robust systems for evaluating
contractors prior to award, and also for closely monitoring costs and expenditures
(Russell & Jaselskis, 1992). In a separate study, Russell & Jaselskis (1992) also
performed an evaluation of failed projects to compare project failure criteria for
evaluating on-going projects. For public projects, they found that the initial cost and
estimated duration were both shorter for failure cases. However failed projects’ increase
percent in cost was over five times that of successful projects, and schedule growth more
than three times greater. Cost and safety monitoring was also significantly lower for
failed projects than successful projects. They also suggested the development of more
robust evaluation procedures for contractors in public contracts but admitted that this
process may encounter legal and political challenges (Russell & Jaselskis, 1992). In
support of these results, Severson et al. (1994) used contractor finance data to predict
whether or not a contractor would breach a contract and be forced to resort to bond
claims. Their results further supported the recommendation that, to reduce the probability
of default, owners should thoroughly evaluate contractors prior to award.
With regard to quantitative construction research in eastern countries, only one
basic study was found. Al-Momani (2000) performed a study in Jordan using 130
projects of differing categories (residential, administrative, school, medical, and
communication) to determine delay cause and time impact. He found that 24.6%
experienced delays from poor design, and 15.4% experienced delays from change orders.
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Overall, all project genres had a mean actual completion time significantly longer than
the planned completion (Al-Momani, 2000).
Another method to determine inputs for a model is using key performance
indicators (KPIs) identified in current literature. Chan’s meta-analysis of KPIs found that
time and cost are the primary objective indicators of a successful project and health,
safety, and financial performance are secondary indicators. Additionally, his study found
quality to be the primary subjective indicator of a successful project with customer
satisfaction, technical performance, and productivity as secondary indicators (Chan
2002). To achieve project success, Chan et al (2004) identified five general categories of
factors: project management actions, project procedures (procurement and tendering),
external environment, human-related factors, and project-related factors (i.e. type, nature,
size, number of floors, and complexity). Gonzales et al. (2014) also developed a
qualitative framework by which researchers can evaluate root causes of delays in
construction projects. They tested their methodology on three projects and found that
planning, subcontracts, labor, and materials were the top reasons why the projects had
been delayed. They admitted that it was not possible to perform causational analysis from
the frequency of problems alone. Quantitative analysis is required for causation to be
inferred. However, their results provide a helpful means by which to investigate root
causes of delays (González, et al., 2014).
Ultimately, there exists a lot of research that uses qualitative study or linear
regression to determine general causes of delay; unfortunately there does not appear to be
significant research that attempts to use more specific variables to predict construction
delays. Therefore, this research will be exploratory in nature, and will seek to find

18

specific factors that are predictive of project progress. Because no significant research
has been performed in this area to develop a methodology successfully, this paper will
use independent variables from a variety of research: past linear regression studies, key
performance indicator studies, surveys of experts that indicate primary causes of delays,
and root-cause analysis case studies.
Methodology
The analysis explored construction inspection reports from 25 AFCEC projects
using contingency tables to determine if project factors, health and safety, quality,
technical performance, and productivity, and external environmental factors are
predictive of schedule or cost performance in wartime construction projects. This
research focuses on three primary aspects of the data: project factors, performance
factors, and environmental factors. The project factors are basic metadata with regard to
each project. Examples are award, contract length, and number of contract modifications.
Performance factors are related to major construction, design, and material, deficiencies
cited by the quality assurance engineer. Environmental factors are related to all external
environmental factors which are outside the control of the contractor. Examples are
weather, interference from locals, and security threats. All the factors were analyzed to
investigate the effect on the schedule and cost. Input factors for analysis were developed
based on a combination of the literature review and a basic breakdown of construction
discipline types. They are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2 – Analysis Factors
Project Factors
Award Amount
Final Cost
Awarded Cost Growth (Index)
Number of Contract Modifications
Number of Change Orders (Scope Changes)
Initial Period of Performance
Initial Period of Performance
Final Period of Performance
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index)

Performance Factors
Quality Factors
Horizontal work (Concrete and/or Asphalt)
Building Foundation (Concrete/Rebar/Soils)
Electrical (High and Low Voltage, Comm Lines/Outlets)
Mechanical (HVAC, Gas, Boilers)
Utility (Water, Sewer, and Storm)
Structural (Masonry, Steel, and Wood)
Interior Finishing (Doors, Tiles, Walls, Ceilings, Bathroom Fixtures, Paint)
Exterior finishing (Windows, Exterior doors, Garage Doors, Fences)
Technical Performance Factors
Design Performance
Material/Submittals
Health and Safety
Safety Incidents and/or Deficiencies

External Environmental Factors
Region of Afghanistan
Security Incidents
Other External Environment Issues
Weather
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The primary data source for this research was the daily reports, provided
by the quality assurance engineer, for each of the 25 projects. Each report contains
significant project factors, quality discussion (positive and negative), incidents, mishaps,
safety information, progress information, and more. The average award cost was $25.5
million, and the average final cost of the projects was $33.2 million. The majority of the
projects focused on vertical construction, with some horizontal construction. Table 3
provides summary data regarding the projects.
The daily quality reports were coded by type of factor (cf. Table 2) yielding the
independent variables for this study. When an occurrence of a factor was encountered in
the review of the daily reports, the incident was recorded. Each occurrence was
independently linked to the project and all of the meta-data associated with that project.
This allowed for a summary coding for each project, which then allowed for
differentiation between projects, based on cost and schedule performance.
Table 3 – Project Data

Project Information

Mean

Median

$25.5 M $17.0 M
Award Amount
$33.2 M $23.9 M
Final Cost
8.73
7
Number of Contract Modifications
2.93
2
Change Orders (Scope Changes)
383
365
Initial Period of Performance
823
741
Final Period of Performance

Standard
Deviation
$21.4 M
$28.7 M
3.94
2.40
145
354

Weather was the most commonly reported external environment issue, followed
by security incidents, and then any other external environmental issue, which ranged
from locals and the Afghan National Army interfering with the project, to a swine flu
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outbreak halting progress on several projects for multiple days. Most projects had fewer
than 40 days of weather delays. The maximum number of delays days due to security was
18, however, the majority of the projects had fewer than 6 days cited. A summary is
shown in Table 4.
Table 4 – External Environmental
Factor

Mean Median

Security Incidents (days lost)
Other external environmental issues (days lost)
Weather (days lost)

5.32
6.60
20.32

3
1
12

Standard
Deviation
6.08
11.70
21.95

There was also significant variance in the number of performance deficiencies
noted between the projects. The most common performance problems were with the
design and material submittals of the project. Because of the thorough government
review system, there were no recorded incidents of poor engineering, which led to a
failure. However, as a corollary, the most common problem was contractors submitting
finalized designs that did not address all the review comments, causing many
unnecessary review/resubmit cycles. The majority of projects had between 0 and 15
design performance incidents, with one project that had 31.. For material and submittal
deficiencies, the contractor was often late in submitting material submittals, and also
commonly ordered materials that did not coincide with the original submittal. However,
most projects maintained an incident rate of 5 or less, with three projects being above
that, and one as high as 24.
Of the eight quality factors, four had significant variance. The most common
quality problem was electrical work (M=4.0, SD = 6.72) (both high and low voltage).
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The project with the most electrical problems had 28 recorded incidents. Rate of
electrical incidents were slightly more distributed (between 0 and 20), and the highest
count was 28 incidents. Structural issues were reported second most commonly (M=3.0,
SD = 4.85), the projects with the most structural issues had respectively 14 and 20
incidents.. Foundation problems were also common (M = 2.7, SD = 5.8); most projects
did not have many foundation problems, but two projects had 12 and 28 respectively.
Lastly, utility issues (M = 1.7, SD = 2.72) had two outliers with 8 and 11 incidents. A
summary of project performance is provided in Table 5.
Table 5 – Project Performance Summary
Deficiencies (No. of occurrences) Mean Median
Project Management
Contract Management
Design Performance
Material & Submittals
Safety Deficiencies
Reportable Safety Incidents
Horizontal work
Building Foundation
Electrical
Mechanical
Utility
Structural
Interior Finishing
Exterior finishing

1.37
1.70
6.52
4.07
2.56
0.76
0.78
2.70
4.00
0.52
1.74
3.00
0.85
0.48

0
0
5
2
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

Standard
Deviation
2.06
2.75
6.51
4.95
5.22
1.33
1.90
5.77
6.72
0.90
2.72
4.85
1.37
0.56

The data was coded by type of factor. Each factor was assigned a number, and
when an occurrence of a factor is encountered in the review of the daily reports, the
number will be assigned to that specific day of the project. Each occurrence was
independently linked to the project and all of the meta-data associated with that project.
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This allowed for a summary coding for each project, which will then allow for easy
differentiation between projects, based on cost and schedule performance.
The contingency tables were used to test independence between the project
factors (cf. Table 2) and cost or schedule. Contingency tables use categorical variables to
sort occurrences of incidents, and then create marginal probabilities. They then use a
multinomial experiment that tests for independence between the categorical outcomes
(McClave, et al., 2011). They are a common tool for analyzing categorical data where the
researcher is trying to determine the dependence versus independence. The Fisher’s
exact test was used to analyze the contingency tables due to the small sample size.
Contingency tables have been used to analyze procurement methods in the construction
industry to determine which factors are most predictive of overall schedule performance
(the study was not able to show any dependent factors with regard to cost) (Naoum,
1994). Likewise, Cheng, et al. (2010) used contingency tables combined with other
descriptive statistics to determine factors that cause construction accidents for small
companies in Taiwan.
As contingency tables require categorical data, the project factor quantitative data
was converted into qualitative categories. Every category had a large grouping of
incidents of a certain deficiency (usually ranging from 0 to as high as 5 incidents), and
each distribution had several outlier projects. The major “breakpoint” (where the largest
grouping of projects ended) was nearly always at the 75th percentile; although there were
some cases when it was at the 50th percentile. These breakpoints then served as the
means of determining whether a project possessed a “normal” value for that factor or not.
The breakpoints for all factors are shown in Table 6 (note that unless otherwise indicated,
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the units reference to the number of incidents). When a project’s factor was less than or
equal to the breakpoint, the project was nominally coded with a “0”. When a factor was
greater than the breakpoint, the project was assigned a “1”. These assignments
determined which row of the table a project would be assigned to (e.g. a project which
had even one reportable safety incident would be assigned a 1, because it had greater than
0 reportable safety incidents). To determined the column, projects which performed
within budget were assigned a “1”, and assigned a “0” if over-budget. Projects that met
their contractual schedule requirements were assigned a “1”, and those that did not were
given a “0”.
The dependent variables for this study were calculated based on schedule and cost
performance; they were considered either behind schedule or ahead of schedule/ onschedule and over budget or within budget. As no two projects are alike in their project
performance, the amount that a project finished ahead of or behind schedule was
normalized to an index (e.g., contract 365 / actual 400 = 1.2) The index was shown as a
distribution and analyzed for “break points” where there is a natural divide between
certain severities of behind or ahead of schedule to provide qualitative categories from
which the quantitative response variables were separated. Additionally, to subjectively
evaluate the joint budget and schedule of projects, earned-value analysis was performed
by using either iterative schedule updates, or the invoice account data, both provided by
the construction agent. The earned value plot was measured to determine the percent of
the total duration that a project was over-budget or under-budget, as well as for schedule.
Additionally, the quality assurance engineering performed multiple evaluations of the
project schedule, as well as their own evaluations of the earned value. Their qualitative
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comments were extracted from the daily reports. As a final step, the general classification
was validated by the construction agent for accuracy.

Table 6 – Nominal Break Points
Project Information
Award Amount
Final Cost
Awarded Cost Growth (Index)
Number of Contract Modifications
Initial Period of Performance
Final Period of Performance
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index)
Security Incidents
Other external environmental issue
Weather
Project Management
Contract Management
Design Performance
Material & Submittals
Safety Deficiencies
Reportable Safety Incidents
Horizontal work
Building Foundation
Electrical
Mechanical
Utility
Structural
Interior Finishing
Exterior finishing

Break Point
$19 M
$21.19 M
1.26
9
868 days
842 days
2.2
5 days
8 days
19 days
1
2
5
5
3
0
1
2
4
0
2
2
1
0

Results
Four factors had a causal relationship with cost or schedule growth, each with one
degree of freedom. Cost growth was predicted by awarded schedule growth and the final
project, and cost growth was reduced by mechanical issues. Schedule growth was
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predicted by awarded schedule growth and project management issues. Budget
performance was dependent on the final cost of the project, but not the awarded cost.
Budget performance was also found to be positively dependent on the presence of
mechanical issues, implying a project’s budget performance improved given the presence
of HVAC deficiencies. Awarded schedule growth was predictive of both cost and
schedule growth. Awarded schedule growth occurred when the government awarded the
contractor uncompensable excusable delays or additional time for scope changes. Thus,
projects were more likely to be over-budget when additional time was granted to
complete the project. Lastly, schedule performance was also dependent on whether or not
the project experienced project management-related issues.
Table 7 – Contingency Table Results for Budget Performance

Level
Final Cost ≤ $21.19M
Final Cost > $21.19M
Awarded Schedule Growth ≤ 2.2
Awarded Schedule Growth > 2.2
Mechanical issues = 0
Mechanical issues > 0

Over Budget
(n=10)
4.0%
36.0%
8.0%
32.0%
40.0%
0%

Within Budget
(n=15)
32.0%
28.0%
44.0%
16.0%
32.0%
28.0%

Fisher’s test
p-value
0.0405
0.0154
0.0202

Table 8 – Contingency Table Results for Schedule Performance

Level
Awarded Schedule Growth ≤ 2.2
Awarded Schedule Growth > 2.2
Project Management issues ≤ 1
Project Management issues > 1

Over Schedule
(n=15)
20.0%
40.0%
28.0%
32.0%
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Within Schedule
(n=10)
32.0%
8.0%
36.0%
4.0%

Fisher’s test
p-value
0.0414
0.0405

While correlation is not causation, correlation tests were conducted to further
explain the common trends among the study variables and to identify factors that may
have indirect relationships. Table 9 shows statistically significant correlations that are
related to the primary factors that may possess an indirect relationship with schedule or
budget performance.

Table 9 – Kendall's Correlation Test (Secondary Factors)
Kendall
T

Prob
>|T|

0.3533

0.0133

0.54

0.0002

0.4348

0.0024

0.42

0.0033

0.3267

0.0267

0.3545

0.0133

0.44

0.0165

Material & Submittals

0.3985

0.0216

Safety Deficiencies

0.3851

0.0297

Number of Contract Modifications Final Cost

0.3406

0.0209

Number of Contract Modifications Award Amount

0.2919

0.0477

Utility

0.4838

0.0064

Variable
Awarded Schedule Growth
(Index)
Final Period of Performance

by Variable

Final Period of Performance

Initial Period of Performance

Final Period of Performance

Initial Period of Performance

Award Amount
Number of Contract
Modifications
Final Cost

Interior Finishing

Mechanical

Mechanical
Mechanical

Final Period of Performance

Final Period of Performance
Final Cost

Mechanical

Discussion
The predictive factors for schedule and budget performance are those commonly
seen in peacetime projects. Project management issues and awarded schedule growth is
predictive of schedule performance problems; final cost and awarded schedule growth are
predictive of budget performance problems. Correlation results agreed with the
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contingency table results and provided additional insight regarding the relationships. The
external environment factors were not found to have a significant effect.
Performance Factors.
The significant effect that management can have on the performance of a project
should never be underestimated. The contingency tables showed that project management
deficiencies are predictive of schedule performance, p < 0.05, which was the only
significant performance-related factor. This confirms what previous researchers have
stated about the criticality of project management in the overall performance of a project
(Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Chan, et al., 2004). Project management deficiencies also
correlated negatively with schedule performance, r = -0.36, p < 0.05. The more project
management deficiencies that were cited by QA engineers, the more likely it was that a
project would be behind schedule.
Cost.
The contingency tables found dependency between the project’s final cost (above
or below $21.19M) and its budget performance, p = 0.04. However, no relationship was
found based on the initial cost of the project; p = 0.11. Thus, the data does not seem to
suggest that higher-cost projects are inherently at a higher risk of budget overruns;
instead, it suggests that there is a second-order effect causing the budget performance
issues. One possible mediating factor is contract modifications. They were correlated to
both the award amount, r = 0.29, p < 0.05, and the final cost of projects, r = 0.34,
p < 0.05. Final period of performance also increased whenever contract modifications
were introduced, r = 0.33, p < 0.05. Additionally, final cost was shown to correlate
significantly with both the initial, r = 0.35, p < 0.05, and the final period of performance,
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r = 0.54, p < 0.001, showing there may be a triangular relationship between cost,
schedule, and contract modifications. These relationships may imply that the number of
contract modifications increases with project scope and not solely cost growth. However,
the price increases that inevitably come with changes appear to be stronger in the final
cost of the project than the initial award amount. This could confirm the traditional theory
that contractors bid low to win a project with the intent of “making it up with change
orders”; or it could simply recognize that larger projects tend to be more complex and
have more risk for change. Ultimately, as has been shown in previous studies (Assaf &
Al-Hejji, 2006; Chan, et al., 2004; Mansfield, et al., 1994), there remains a connection
between contract modifications and cost measures.
Awarded Schedule Growth.
Another result of the study is the dependent relationship that schedule and cost
performance has with the allowance of additional time to construct a project p < 0.05 for
both cases. Not surprisingly, given the construction location and wartime environment,
every project was granted some additional time to finish by the contracting officer. Yet
this practice increased the likelihood that a project would be considered late and overbudget. Additionally, correlation for cost performance supported the contingency table
results, r = -0.43, p = 0.01. An interview with the AFCEC program manager confirmed
these empirical results. The contractors in Afghanistan would often struggle to regain
momentum when they experienced some kind of delay; even when the delay was
compensable or excusable. Oftentimes, if the delay was compensable, contractors would
end up fronting money to keep the project functioning while the government arranged
proper compensation. But the contractor would sometimes lose too much capital, which
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then required them to lay-off staff and labor (Schoenenberger, 2014). This also may
indirectly caused delays.
Period of performance.
The final period of performance correlated significantly with multiple factors:
final cost, r = 0.54, p < 0.05, award amounts, r = 0.42, p < 0.05 the number of contract
modifications, r = 0.32, p < 0.05, awarded schedule growth, r = 0.35, p < 0.05, and initial
period of performance, r = 0.43, p < 0.05. It is easy to dismiss the latter two factors
because the schedule ought to correlate with other schedule factors. However, the
relationships between two cost factors, initial and final cost, the initial performance
period also correlating with final cost, as well as the number of modifications received
within a project, may imply that the final length of a project could be predicted by a
regression equation involving these factors. This has been done recently for peacetime
federal projects by Hoffman, et al. (2007) and was first done by Bromilow (1969).
Unfortunately, the population size for this study was not large enough to perform
regression analysis. However, these results imply that wartime project could use
peacetime factors to predict the total time to construct with some amount of accuracy. If
this research were performed real-time in future long-term wartime construction efforts, a
prediction model could be built and updated to increase accurate predictions for
beneficial occupancy dates.
Mechanical.
In the contingency table tests, budget performance was shown to be positively
dependent on mechanical deficiencies, p = 0.02. All of the projects that experienced
mechanical difficulties were within budget parameters. It is unknown why the
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relationship between budget performances improved with mechanical problems; to
investigate possible causality sources, correlation tests were performed. Mechanical
issues correlated positively with safety deficiencies, r = 0.38, p < 0.05, material and
submittal problems, r = 0.39, p < 0.05, interior finishing deficiencies, r = 0.44, p < 0.05
and utility deficiencies r = 0.48, p < 0.05. Based on these findings, causality was tested
using contingency tables. Structural and interior finishing deficiencies were found to be
significant, p = 0.02 and p < 0.01, respectively. Unfortunately, this did not explain the
relationship between mechanical deficiencies and budget performance.
Mentionable Lack of Results.
Weather was not found to be a significant factor. The breakpoint was determined
to be at 19 days of delay, roughly the same as the mean (M = 20.2, SD = 22.0). Seven
projects had less than 19 days of delay and 18 projects had more. Projects determined to
have more severe weather delays ranged from 22 days to 77 days. It was observed that
there were three outlier projects in the distribution that had significantly more weather
delays than the remainder of the projects. This finding disagrees with previous research
by Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006), who found that most construction professionals believe
weather is a significant cause of delay. Although it is difficult to draw conclusions from
insignificant results, this may imply that weather’s environmental influence is diminished
in a wartime environment because of other environmental factors, such as labor
availability.
There were not any significant results regarding security incidents or any other
external environmental delays. It is still assumed in this research that these environmental
issues have a stronger influence on project performance than in peace-time projects.
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However, this research was unable to yield any significant results to substantiate this
assumption. It is possible that the effect of these factors is diminished with AFCEC
projects compared to USACE projects. According to the construction agent, AFCEC
maintained stricter security and oversight requirements on the part of the contractor
(Schoenenberger, 2014). This may have reduced the number of incidents that occurred on
AFCEC projects. To substantiate this, further research should be done on the external
environment and then compared to different population samples.
Conclusion & Recommendations
Initially in this research, it was thought that performance and environmental
factors would be very predictive of project performance; perhaps even more so than
project factors. However, project factors tended to be more predictive of budget and
schedule performance than either of the other two categories. The correlation
relationships also suggest that project factors and overall performance, are not tied to
performance factors. Additionally, external environment did not have a significant effect
on the schedule and budget performance of a project. Analysis of these results brings
forth several recommendations.
Minimizing the additional time granted to the contractor may also improve
schedule performance. The research found that when additional time was granted to the
contractor by the government, the likelihood of cost growth and schedule growth
increased. The construction agent suspects that this may be related to the original period
of performance that is often assigned to projects in wartime environments. In some cases,
they believe that not enough time was originally given for contractors to complete their
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projects. Indeed, this exactly what Russell and Jaselskis (1992) found in their contractor
evaluation research: failed projects estimated a significantly smaller period of
performance than successful projects. Additionally, Ibbs (2012) showed that any change
on a project significantly increases the likelihood of failure. He discovered that changes
can have an exponential effect on a project and that proper original planning may have
decreased the overall schedule or budget increases. Therefore, in future contracts it may
be prudent for construction agents and their owners to consider extending FPOP’s; which
may reduce overall cost and schedule overruns.
Additionally, construction agents should ensure a strong financial and historical
evaluation of all contractors and project managers. As mentioned previously, Russell &
Jaselskis (1992) found that contract failure could be directly linked to the amount of
scrutiny that the owner applied to the winning contractor. Moreover, their research
demonstrated the project manger’s critical role in the success of the project (Russell &
Jaselskis, 1992), which was reconfirmed by the results of this study: project and contract
management issues are strongly predictive of poor performance.
Limitations of the study.
Unfortunately, the dataset used in this research was too small to perform
regression analysis or a T-test. However, this fact does not undermine these results. The
significant of the Fisher’s exact test lies in its conservative nature. Fisher’s test has been
known to not find significance in cases where a chi-squared test may find significant
results. While this research would benefit from a larger sample, the results are still
significant.
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The data was quantitative but derived from qualitative data. The QA engineers
were solely responsible for citing performance problems, and it is expected that some
deficiencies or items may have been missed. Additionally, only major deficiencies were
considered for this study. The data lists many minor deficiencies that were ignored. It
would be beneficial to analyze this data in future research.
Future Research.
As mentioned in the introduction, AFCEC’s project execution methodology is
significantly different than USACE. Future researchers should consider using USACE
data for a similar study to compare the results to the AFCEC program. Moreover,
additional methodology can be used in a USACE study because a large sample size
should be easy to achieve.
Labor analysis may play a large role in the slowing of projects, which may be one
of the reasons why schedule performance was not predicted by weather delays.
According to the construction agent, many projects experienced slow progress, due to a
dearth of skilled workers in-country. A fast-moving project that has a plethora of skilled
laborers on site may be as more affected by poor weather than a project that is already
progressing slowly. Future research should consider the effect of quality of labor as well
as the number of workers that are present on-site for the project.
Similar research should also be applied to other wartime environments. Iraq is a
viable candidate because it is a recent construction effort and nearly identical in purpose.
Additionally, both AFCEC and USACE performed work in Iraq, which would allow for
another comparison between construction agents.
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Conclusion.
Much research remains in order to fully understand the difference between
wartime and peacetime construction projects. The literature review shows that the body
of knowledge is very small in this industry, yet the monetary expenditure has the
potential to be great (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan). Based on this research, there are many
similarities between wartime and peacetime construction, which should cause
construction agencies to create more strict policies for contractors, in spite of the
environment. However, this research covers only a small part of the industry within one
campaign. Government agencies should increase sponsorships of wartime construction to
gain additional insight, saving money which could otherwise be used elsewhere.
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III. Scholarly Article 2: Quantitative Analysis of Construction Contract Type
Differences in a Wartime Environment
Ryan M. Hoff; Gregory D. Hammond, Ph.D., P.E.; Peter P. Feng, Ph.D., P.E.; Edward D.
White, Ph.D
Abstract
US-led construction projects in Afghanistan have performed poorly on average;
indeed, it is the norm to deliver projects late to need and over budget to the customer.
Using a dataset of 25 Afghan wartime projects, we address the question: How do project
outcomes differ based on the contract type? First, with regards to critical success factors,
current literature suggests that wartime projects may face the same cost and schedule
factors as peacetime projects, with some notable additions. Using peacetime factors as a
baseline, project factors, health and safety compliance, quality of work, technical
performance, work productivity, and external environmental factors were used as
dependent variables in a series of Mann-Whitney tests. We found reimbursable contracts
to have significantly greater cost and schedule growth. Additionally, fixed price projects
were found to have more problems with design performance and contract management.
There was no significant difference in overall project quality. In conclusion, cost
monitoring from the owner and scrutiny of project management is critical to the success
of reimbursable contracts, and technical performance monitoring is necessary to ensure
that fixed-price projects meet deadlines.
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Introduction
United States inspection reports and its popular press are replete with examples of
wasteful spending of taxpayer dollars on Afghanistan construction projects (GAO, 2013;
GAO, 2014; Thibault, 2011; CWC, 2011; Chappell, 2013). As summarized by an
American official involved in the construction program, “nobody was watching it like
they should have, and it’s just been an open checkbook.” (Craig, 2013) The Commission
on Wartime contracting estimated in their 2011 final report that at least $31 billion, but
possibly as much as $60 billion could be considered “waste” during the lifetime of the
Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. (CWC, 2011) With $23 billion being allocated to
wartime construction efforts as of 2014 (GAO, 2014) construction companies have had
financial incentives to be involved in the US-led reconstruction effort. Construction waste
can have many different meanings. It can mean poorly planned, overseen, or built
projects; it can be abuse and corruption (SIGAR, 2010). Additionally, it can be the
construction of unwanted or unneeded facilities or projects delivered over budget and
behind schedule (Teo & Loosemore, 2001; Sopko, 2013; Thibault, 2011). In this paper,
we will explore construction waste using the framework of contract types. Specifically,
we will determine what construction waste occurs as a result of cost-plus-fixed-fee versus
fixed-fee contracting.
The federal acquisition regulations (FAR) describes the process (FAR Part
16.103, .104) used by the US government to solicit and award contracts. The two most
common contract types allowed by the FAR are the firm-fixed price (FFP) contract and
the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract. These two contracts differ vastly in their
structure and purpose. The FFP contract places the cost and schedule risk on the
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contractor, while the CPFF contract shifts much of this risk to the US government to
account for projects with high levels of uncertainty or risk (FAR Part 16.101 b). The
idiosyncrasies of each contract type have caused contractors to behave differently in their
interaction with the customer, performance of the project, spending behaviors, schedule
adherence (Adler & Scherer, 1999). However, no research has been done to show
differences in contractor behaviors across contract types in a wartime construction
environment.
Limited research has been performed on the performance differences between
fixed price and reimbursable construction projects. Structural differences between fixed
price and reimbursable contracts have been extensively researched (Nkuah, 2006; Veld &
A, 1989; Ward & Chapman, 1994; Wamuziri, 2013; Branconi & Loch, 2004) as have the
types of human behaviors that are inspired by the two contract types (Müller & Turner,
2005; Osipova, 2014). However, specific causes of contract type performance differences
are not fully understood (Adler & Scherer, 1999; Jaszkowiak, 2012). Consequently,
owners do not fully understand how the selection of a contract type may affect project
success or conversely induce waste (Veld & A, 1989). Moreover, this research may be
particularly relevant to military owners who contract projects in wartime environments.
While reimbursable contracts may entice companies to submit bids, they also provide
significant possibility for cost growth and may need to be monitored differently than
fixed-price contracts. Conversely, fixed price contracts in wartime environments may
shift so much risk on contractors that it is impossible for companies to make a profit.
Therefore, this research effort will use data from 25 Afghan wartime construction
projects to search for factor differences between fixed-price and reimbursable projects
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that cause waste. The major factors will be project attributes, health and safety, quality,
technical performance, productivity, and the external environment.
Literature Review
US contract and project management personnel who have worked in the
Afghanistan reconstruction efforts were ill-prepared to manage projects there. Security
concerns, unqualified personnel, poor planning, improper contract solicitations, poor
planning, and weak management have all contributed to waste within the US-Afghan
reconstruction efforts (Thibault, 2011). To further complicate the challenges faced by the
owners, the literature suggests that contract type choices will cause contractors to behave
differently, depending on which contract type is used (Jaszkowiak, 2012; Adler &
Scherer, 1999). This research investigated these behaviors so that construction
professionals can have clearer expectations for contract performance in future wartime
projects in order to minimize waste.
The contract types used in this wartime construction projects study are firm-fixed
price (FFP) and cost-plus fixed fee (CPFF). In FFP contracts, the key component is
referred as the pre-calculation, in which the contractor and the client negotiate a dollar
amount separate from the actual costs of the project. The contractor shoulders the
majority of the risk in this case, and the client knows in advance how much will be paid
to the contractor. The owner’s risk is limited to design or specification errors (United
States v. Spearin, 1918). Furthermore, the contractor’s risk is based on its ability to
provide an accurate estimate that will adequately cover its costs, yield a small profit, and
qualify as the lowest, but most technically acceptable, bid (Smith, Currie & Hancock,

40

2009). A cost-plus contract is a “cost reimbursable” contract, which require the client to
reimburse the contractor for the ultimate costs of the project irrespective of initial
estimates. In the case of a CPFF project, the contractor is also paid a fixed and prenegotiated fee for their services. (Veld & A, 1989; Ward & Chapman, 1994). Thus, the
owner assumes risks not only for the design but also for increases in material and labor
costs. In contrast, the contractor assumes little risk as the owner underwrites the project
(Nkuah, 2006).
For all federal projects, the project contracting officer is the ultimate decisionmaker for which contract type used for a contract (FAR Part 16.1). Many factors must be
considered when choosing a contract method such as price competition, price analysis,
cost analysis, type and complexity of the project, urgency of the project, and performance
period of the contract (FAR part 16.1). Certain levels of uncertainty are tolerable for a
fixed-price contract, but the market typically will not accept high levels of uncertainty
without adequate compensation. Therefore, with high levels of risk, it behooves the
owner to assume that risk and use reimbursable contract in order to save money and time
(Nkuah, 2006). Historically, reimbursable contracts are generally not used, in larger
development projects due to the risk of substantial cost overruns; as is common in
construction projects (Veld & A, 1989). According to the FAR, the selected contract
type should maximize the value to the government.
Contract type also influences project performance. Adler & Sherer (1999) used a
multi-variate methodology with transaction cost analysis (TCA) to evaluate differences
between reimbursable, fixed-price, and incentive contracts in the defense aerospace
industry (Adler & Scherer, 1999). TCA is the theory that the management of the contract
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is based on several factors: asset specificity, uncertainty, bounded rationality, and
opportunism present in the contract. It also proposes that contracts show differing
amounts of control, coordination, and adaption (Williamson, 1998). The study found
reimbursable projects performed better when the contractor contributes more knowledge
to complete the transaction, but fixed-price contracts are more useful for purchasing
projects that have well-defined requirements (Adler & Scherer, 1999). Thus, ill-defined
projects, with accompanying higher levels of contractor risk, have better outcomes when
coupled with reimbursable projects and well-defined requirements are better suited to
fixed-price contracts. Likewise, Müller and Turner (2005) found fixed-price contracts
cause owners to abdicate their project responsibilities to the contractor causing an
increased likelihood of an adverse outcome. Additionally, they found that reimbursable
contracts encourage contractors to ignore project objectives as they focus on possible
financial gains also threatening project success.
Contract type is commonly promoted as a method for the owner to manage
project risk. Braconi and Loch (2004) developed a framework of eight key business
drivers and determined how fixed price, incentive, and reimbursable projects interact
with the primary factors. They found that fixed price contract demand very well-defined
project attributes (e.g. scope, design, estimates), but require significantly less effort from
owners to ensure that contractors stay within budget and schedule limitations.
Conversely, reimbursable projects are well-suited for ill-defined scopes but require heavy
involvement from the owner to control costs. Incentive based contracts often provide a
healthy balance of risk to both parties but are often difficult to negotiate. They propose
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that fixed contracts can be written so as to reduce the risk in areas of uncertainty, thereby
protecting both the owner and the contractor.
Therefore, selection of a contract type may be crucial to the business success of
an owner. Veld and Peters (1989) developed a decision network by which owners can
select a contract type, based on an owner’s assessment of the contractor’s competency
and ability to manage six criteria: cost uncertainty, technical uncertainty, available extra
resources, schedule criticality, performance criticality, and long-term motives. They
propose that firm-fixed price contracts are never acceptable with a high cost or technical
uncertainty. However, they consider high-uncertainty in the other factors to be acceptable
for fixed-price projects. They make note that military and government agencies rarely use
incentive methods. Ultimately, their recommendation is for project owners to consider
the use of incentive contracts.
Wamuziri (2013) reached the same conclusion as Veld and Peters (1989)
regarding incentive contracts in his study that focused on collaborate procurement for
infrastructure projects. He found that premiums for fixed-price contracts tend to be quite
high, due to the high risk born by the contractor. In opposition, reimbursable contracts,
“[arguably] have reverse incentives for the contractor to drive the costs upwards.”
(Wamuziri, 2013) In order to inspire lower premiums and better technical performance
(both which lower the risk to the owner) it is desirable to increase the number of bidders
for a construction project. But incentive contracts have been shown to provide a healthy
balance of risk between the contractor and the owner, fostering a joint-effort environment
as opposed to high scrutiny and wariness (Berends, 2000).
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Previously, it has been thought that contract type has a significant effect on bid
competition and contractor competency; however previous research has shown that it is
the contract size and scope that is primary predictor of competitiveness, and that perhaps
the contract type is a sub-factor for (Drew & Skitmore, 1997). Indeed, some research
argues that the uncertainty of the project scope and size should be the primary
determinant of contract type, and other risks are considered more tertiary. As previously
discussed, the business culture and relationships between the owner and the contractor
may be a large predictor of the ultimate success of a project, regardless of contract type
(Turner & Simister, 2001).
Despite this research, to-date, significant performance differences between fixedprice and reimbursable projects in a wartime environment have not been researched.
There are many performance factors that can be analyzed. For example, Adler (1999)
found that, in the aerospace acquisition industry, a fixed-price project may not require as
robust of a design effort as a reimbursable project, because project complexity should be
lower for a fixed-price versus a reimbursable. If this is the case, then fixed-price projects
may not experience as many instances of design rework as reimbursable projects.
Jaszkowiak (2012) was able to analyze contract performance metrics (e.g. cost and
schedule perfect performance), but did not have data to analyze performance or
management factors. This research will analyze performance factors as well as cost and
schedule factors.
It is hypothesized that contract type affects project success and waste; the factors
to be tested were determined by reviewing the literature on key performance indicators.
Wartime projects likely face the same delay causes as peacetime projects with some
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notable additions. Only one qualitative study has been performed in Afghanistan
regarding project challenges; many of its observed causes of delay are common in other
nearby Asian and African countries. Delays are caused by design problems, planning
problems, weather interference, unskilled workers/quality problems, and difficulty
working with the owner or lack of direction from the owner, and change orders or scope
changes (Affleck, et al., 2011; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Mansfield, et al., 1994; Marzouk
& El-Rasas, 2014; Olima & K'akumu, 1999).
The Afghanistan study found that, overwhelmingly, security concerns were the
primary challenge to projects. This factor is generally unique to wartime projects. While
the FAR defines delays due to acts of terror as excusable but noncompensable, the data
for this study showed that attacks were often treated as a compensable delay. The
frequency of security problems in Afghanistan is much higher than those experienced in
peacetime construction.
The physical environment of the project is commonly mentioned in both wartime
and peacetime literature. Weather conditions are one of the most commonly cited delay
factors for all projects. Afghanistan has the potential for particularly harsh weather,
especially in the mountainous regions. Affleck, et al. (2010) stated that planning for harsh
weather was particularly poor in Afghanistan. Other industry literature does not discuss
planning but does consistently cite it as a cause for delay. Most construction contracts
allow for a certain number of weather delay days, but also state that is considered an
excusable delay, offering no compensation except in extreme cases (Smith, Currie &
Hancock, 2009).
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Key performance indicators (KPI) were also used as input factors to analyze
differences between contracts. Chan, et al. (2002) performed a meta-analysis of KPIs, as
determined by construction researchers. They found that the most predictive performance
metrics were, predictably, time and cost. Other factors are project safety and financial
performance of the contractor. The largest qualitative predictors were construction
quality and customer satisfaction. A follow-up study by Chan, et al (2004) developed a
framework for project success and identified five categories of factors: project
management actions, project procedures, external environment, human-related factors
(often unpredictable or immeasurable), and project-related factors (e.g. type, size, number
of floors).
Currently, there exists a large amount of research that predicts construction
delays; however, very little analysis has been done to investigate performance differences
between reimbursable and fixed-price contracts. This research will use the collection of
the reviewed delay factors to test the differences between contract types and see if there
are significant differences in waste, which may allow construction agents to oversee
projects better.
Methodology
In order to understand how contract types affect waste in wartime construction
projects, the Mann-Whitney median comparison test will be used to test differences
among the mean for the for project factors, performance factors, and environmental
factors (See Table 10). The project factors are basic metadata with regard to each
project, such as award, contract length, and the number of contract modifications.
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Performance factors are related to major construction, design, and material quality
control deficiencies cited by the quality assurance engineer. Additionally, it includes
worker health and safety compliance. Environmental factors are related to all external
environmental factors which are outside the control of the contractor. Weather,
interference from locals, and security threats are examples of the external environment.
All these potential sources of waste were analyzed to determine if firm-fixed price or cost
reimbursable contracts caused more project waste.
The response variables were obtained from an analysis of the each project’s daily
reports, created by the US government’s quality assurance engineer. Twenty-five
projects were analyzed; 11 were FFP and 14 were CPFF. Each report contained
comments regarding construction quality (positive and negative) as well as daily
construction activities (e.g. quality deficiencies, mock-up meetings, progress for each
craft). They also documented delays, security incidents, safety mishaps or deficiencies.
The average award cost was $25.5 million, and the average final cost of the projects was
$33.2 million. The majority of the projects focused on vertical construction. Table 11
provides summary data regarding the projects.
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Table 10 - Analysis Factors
Project Factors
Award Amount
Final Cost
Awarded Cost Growth (Index)
Number of Contract Modifications
Number of Change Orders (Scope Changes)
Number of FPOP extensions
Total days added to the contract
Initial Period of Performance
Initial Period of Performance
Final Period of Performance
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index)
Performance Factors
Quality Factors
Horizontal work (Concrete and/or Asphalt)
Building Foundation (Concrete/Rebar/Soils)
Electrical (High and Low Voltage, Comm Lines/Outlets)
Mechanical (HVAC, Gas, Boilers)
Utility (Water, Sewer, and Storm)
Structural (Masonry, Steel, and Wood)
Interior Finishing (Doors, Tiles, Walls, Ceilings, Bathroom Fixtures, Paint)
Exterior finishing (Windows, Exterior doors, Garage Doors, Fences)
Technical Performance Factors
Design Performance
Material/Submittals
Health and Safety
Safety Incidents and/or Deficiencies
External Environmental Factors
Region of Afghanistan
Security Incidents
Other External Environment Issues
Weather
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The daily quality reports were coded by type of factor (i.e., Table 10) yielding the
independent variables for this study. When an occurrence of a factor was encountered in
the review of the daily reports, the incident was recorded. Each occurrence was
independently linked to the project and all of the meta-data associated with that project.
This allowed for a summary coding for each project, which then allowed for
differentiation between projects, based on contract type.
Table 11 - Project Data

Project Information

Mean

Median

$25.5 M $17.0 M
Award Amount
$33.2 M $23.9 M
Final Cost
8.73
7
Number of Contract Modifications
2.93
2
Change Orders (Scope Changes)
365
Initial Period of Performance (days) 382.76
822.84
741
Final Period of Performance (days)

Standard
Deviation
$21.4 M
$28.7 M
3.94
2.40
144.82
353.70

Weather was the most commonly reported external environment issue, followed
by security incidents, and then any other external environmental issue, which ranged
from locals and the Afghan National Army interfering with the project, to a swine flu
outbreak halting progress on several projects for multiple days. Most projects had fewer
than 40 days of weather delays. The maximum number of delays days due to security was
18. However, the majority of the projects had fewer than 6 days cited. A summary is
shown in Table 12.
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Table 12 – External Environmental
Factor

Mean Median

Security Incidents (days lost)
Other external environmental issues (days lost)
Weather (days lost)

5.32
6.60
20.32

3
1
12

Standard
Deviation
6.08
11.70
21.95

There was also significant variance in the number of performance deficiencies
noted between the projects. The most common performance problems were with the
design and material submittals of the project. There were no recorded incidents of poor
engineering, which led to a failure. However, as the government had a thorough review
process, the most commonly observed problem was contractors submitting finalized
designs that did not address all the review comments, causing many unnecessary
review/resubmit cycles. The majority of projects had between 0 and 15 design
performance incidents, and one project had 31. For material and submittal deficiencies,
contractors were often late in submitting material submittals, and they also commonly
ordered materials that did not coincide with the original submittal. However, most
projects maintained an incident rate of 5 or less, with three projects being above that, and
one as high as 24. The material submittal incidents were slightly more distributed (90%
between 0 and 20), and the highest count was 28 incidents.
Of the eight quality factors, four had significant variance. The most common
quality problem was electrical work (M=4.0, SD = 6.72) (both high and low voltage).
The project with the most electrical problems had 28 recorded incidents. Structural
issues were reported second most commonly (M=3.0, SD = 4.85), the projects with the

50

most structural issues had respectively 14 and 20 incidents. Most projects did not have
many foundation problems (M = 2.7, SD = 5.8) but two projects had 12 and 28 each.
Lastly, utility issues (M = 1.7, SD = 2.72) had two outliers with 8 and 11 incidents. A
summary of project performance is provided in Table 13.
Table 13 - Project Deficiency Summary
Deficiencies (No. of occurrences) Mean Median
Project Management
Contract Management
Design Performance
Material & Submittals
Safety Deficiencies
Reportable Safety Incidents
Horizontal work
Building Foundation
Electrical
Mechanical
Utility
Structural
Interior Finishing
Exterior finishing

1.37
1.70
6.52
4.07
2.56
0.76
0.78
2.70
4.00
0.52
1.74
3.00
0.85
0.48

0
0
5
2
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

Standard
Deviation
2.06
2.75
6.51
4.95
5.22
1.33
1.90
5.77
6.72
0.90
2.72
4.85
1.37
0.56

The research will use the Mann-Whitney test to evaluate dependencies and
differences in the analysis factors between contract types. The Mann-Whitney test is an
appropriate choice for use of small-sample, non-parametric comparison between the
medians of two different populations because it does not rely on data distribution. Rather,
it uses a median ranking comparisons of each data-point to determine a sum-rank score,
which is then converted to a hypothesis test statistic and used in a standard z-test. (Gold,
2007). Ultimately, the hypothesis test will determine if the median is statistically different
between contract types and can determine if there is a significant difference in the amount
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of waste as measured by the average performance of a FFP contract over a CPFF in a
continuous variable, such as schedule or cost performance.
Results
The study used the Mann-Whitney pairwise comparison test with a 2-sided,
normal approximation to test the hypothesized factors. The results, shown in Table 14,
indicate that there are five significant factors and one near significant factor that
displayed differences across contract types. The “U” value is the rank assigned to the
variable; the “z” is the test statistic value and the “Sig. (2-tailed)” is the p-value for the
test. Factors were determined to be significant if they possessed a p-value of 0.05 or less.
The final cost, awarded cost growth, final period of performance, design performance,
and contract management were significant as a result of contract type.
In the daily reports, a project management deficiency was anything associated
with the poor planning or management of the work on-site. For example, oftentimes the
contractor would proceed with the work without coordinating with the QA engineer,
performing proper inspections beforehand, or developing and publishing a QC plan.
Another example is scheduling conflicting craft disciplines in the same work area,
resulting in delays and worker conflicts.
Contract management items were primarily issues where the contractor failed to
meet contractual requirements. Examples are a contractor’s failure to submit an updated
schedule, master plan, utility plan, progress and status updates. Another common
infraction was providing proper living and working conditions for the QA engineer(s).
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We took great care to ensure that design performance was defined so that these
issues did not overlap with project or contract management. Therefore, these issues only
included design quality and design schedule performance. Although the construction
agent has now since identified several design flaws post-contract completion, there were
no recorded occurrences of construction failure as a result of poor design. Late design
submissions were the primary problem. As a result, the contractor often worked at risk
(working at risk was not coded independently, because it was nearly always caused by
late design).
The awarded schedule growth index was calculated by dividing the final
government-allowed period of performance by initial contractual period of performance.
This is not necessarily the actual performance period. The actual period of performance
could not be used to calculate a schedule growth factor because of the inherent
differences between fixed-price and reimbursable contracts. Fixed price projects are
contractually able to continue in operation after the contractual completion date has
expired. This is because the risk is placed on the contractor. However, reimbursable
contracts must be closed out when the period of performance expires unless the owner
extends the contractual completion date. Therefore, in a reimbursable contract, the actual
completion date is always the same or before the contractual date. This makes actual
completion dates incomparable between the contract types, which is why the contractual
completion date was chosen for both projects. Moreover, the contractual completion date
is within the control of the owner (whereas actual completion in fixed contracts is not),
and is thereby a superior factor to compare between the two contract types.
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Table 14 –Mann-Whitney test for contract types
Factor
Award Amount
Final Cost
Awarded Cost Growth
Number of Contract
Modifications
Change Orders
Number of FPOP extensions
Total Days Added to
Contract
Initial Period of Performance
Final Period of Performance
Awarded Schedule Growth
Security Incidents
Other external
environmental issue
Weather
Project Management
Contract Management
Design Performance
Material & Submittals
Safety Deficiencies
Reportable Safety Incidents
Horizontal work
Building Foundation
Electrical
Mechanical
Utility

Type

Mean

CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF
FFP
CPFF

$25.6
$25.3
$37.5
$27.7
1.48
1.13
10.1
7.4
3.4
2.1
5.4
3.3
591
330
390
373
945
668
2.46
1.86
4.1
6.9
5.4
8.2
22.9
17.1
1.3
1.6
1.2
2.6
3.9
10.1
6.1
2.3
1.9
3.9
0.7
0.8
0.6
1.2
2.1
4.0
3.4
5.0
0.5
0.6
1.7
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Standard
Deviation
$17.6 M
$26.4 M
$28.6 M
$29.1 M
0.38
0.17
4.8
1.8
2.8
1.4
2.4
1.3
275
151
145
145
400
209
0.77
0.61
4.5
7.3
8.9
14.4
22.4
21.3
2.1
2.2
2.8
2.7
2.7
8.2
8.5
3.7
3.4
7.0
1.0
1.7
0.9
2.8
3.2
8.1
4.6
9.1
1.2
1.2
2.9

S

Z

Prob>|Z|

125

-0.96

0.338

105

-2.05

0.040*

98

-2.44

0.015*

124

-1.02

0.308

120

-1.26

0.208

103.5

-2.17

0.030*

97

-2.49

0.013*

138.5

-0.22

0.827

105

-2.05

0.040*

107

-1.94

0.0521

157

0.74

0.457

151.5

0.45

0.653

126.5

-0.88

0.380

154

0.63

0.526

180.5

2.15

0.031*

187

2.39

0.017*

119

-1.32

0.186

157.5

0.80

0.425

135

-0.48

0.631

140

-0.17

0.868

151.5

0.45

0.652

132.5

-0.58

0.561

152.5

0.62

0.531

150

0.37

0.709

Standard
S
Z
Deviation
FFP
2.1
2.6
CPFF
3.2
5.3
Structural
149.5 0.33
FFP
3.4
4.5
CPFF
0.6
1.0
Interior Finishing
156
0.77
FFP
1.3
1.7
CPFF
0.6
1.2
Exterior finishing
151
0.48
FFP
0.5
0.5
*Signifies 2-tailed significance (p < 0.05). Reject null hypothesis.
1
Nearly significant; and is significant using Fisher’s Exact Test in a contingency table.
Factor

Type

Mean

Prob>|Z|
0.738
0.438
0.628

The awarded schedule growth was a near-significant factor in the Mann-Whitney
test. Therefore, further investigation was appropriate. A contingency table using Fisher’s
exact test revealed that awarded schedule growth was dependent on contract-type (p =
0.0154).
Discussion of Results
Cost.
Reimbursable contracts were found to have significantly higher costs than fixed
price contracts. This difference was found for cost increases during the life of the project
and for the final project cost. Notably, there was not a significant difference between
award amounts of contract types. These findings demonstrate that reimbursable contracts
are likely to be awarded at similar prices to firm-fixed price contracts, but are likely to
cost more at the end of the project. The validity of this conclusion is strengthened by the
significant difference seen in cost growth. In the analysis, large projects were compared
alongside small projects; and there may have been considerable variance between the
project factors, which may reduce the credibility of a direct comparison in terms of raw
cost or some other attribute. The cost growth index normalizes the projects’ cost
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comparisons. For example, larger projects may have differences in risk and nature of
work than smaller projects. Additionally, when a larger project experiences delay, it
ought to cost more money to make up the time deficit. The cost growth index removes
unique assignments of cost to enable comparisons. When this was done, we found that
the ratio between final and initial costs is significantly higher for reimbursable contracts
versus fixed price contracts. Higher cost growth in reimbursable contracts aligns with
other industry research. Reimbursable contracts do not incentivize cost-control (Nkuah,
2006); rather they may incentivize cost growth (Wamuziri, 2013).
Schedule.
The average time required to complete a reimbursable project is greater than the
time for a fixed-price project. This finding confirms Jaszkowiak’s (2012) finding for
other Afghan and Iraq US military construction projects. The observed schedule growth
is expected because structurally, schedule and cost growth are strongly linked in
reimbursable contracts. By law, schedules extensions are accompanied by an increase in
funding (GSA, 1984). Based on this structural connection, we would expect contract
modifications to be a mediating variable. Indeed, previous research has shown that
contract changes are closely related to schedule performance in projects (Ibbs, 2012).
While total number of scope modifications was not different between the contract types,
reimbursable contracts had more schedule modifications than fixed contracts.
Additionally, the number of days added to the contract was also higher for reimbursable
contracts. Therefore, the results suggest that, rather than scope changes being the cause of
schedule extensions, as Ibbs (2012) suggested, it may be some other mediating factor, or
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possibly the contractor’s lack of incentive to adhere to the schedule that begets more time
extensions in reimbursable contracts.
Contract types also had a near-significantly p-value for differences in the awarded
schedule growth index. The p-value was so close to 0.05 (unlike any other factor) that
additional analysis was performed for the factor. A contingency table showed that
schedule growth could be dependent on contract type. Reimbursable contracts had higher
schedule growth than fixed contracts. This reflects similar behavior as discussed with
final costs: contractors for reimbursable contracts may not be motivated to control
schedule growth (Nkuah, 2006). FFP contractors are incentivized to minimize
construction costs and schedule, which involves indirect costs as the project is delayed.
CPFF contractors do not have these inhibitions for either cost or schedule. The
construction agent reported that contractors would often divide their original bid by the
number of days in the period of performance to establish a daily burn rate. Oftentimes,
the daily burn rate was maintained or exceeded. But just as often, the planned schedule
was not met, and the allocated funds were exhausted before the project was complete.
Therefore, when more time was granted to the project, additional funding had to be
granted to complete the same project (Schoenenberger, 2014). By design, CPFF projects
have greater potential for schedule growth, and this research found that for this sample,
on average they did exhibit more schedule growth.
Performance.
Fixed-price contracts underperformed compared to reimbursable contracts in
design performance and the contract management of the project. The daily reports
indicated that the majority of the reported design deficiencies were due to incomplete
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design submissions to the government. The incomplete designs created a
rework/resubmission cycle. The contractors would choose to work at risk on the projects
(sometimes for months) beginning construction without final, approved designs in order
to meet contractual performance obligations. Similarly, the contractors frequently worked
at risk as they tried to comply with contract management tasks. Contractors would miss
submission deadlines and would have difficulty correcting the deficiency. However, the
daily reports did not indicate that project quality was directly affected as a result of
contractors working at risk. Acceptable designs or contract submissions were eventually
submitted. The tests suggest that contractors did not pay as close attention to contract and
design documents on fixed price contracts. It is interesting that projects were able to
continue successfully in spite of severely late design submissions and approvals. This
may confirm previous research suggesting there are unnecessary steps in the government
design-review process, or that some details of design are not critical to project completion
and simpler criteria may still yield a successful project (Blomberg, et al., 2014).
Mentionable lack of results.
This study did not find a significant difference in quality performance between the
two contract types. This contrasts with Jaszkowiak’s (2012) work. Her survey of
construction professionals found that a reimbursable project tended to yield better-quality
projects. This research did not find any craftsmanship quality differences between fixed
price and reimbursable projects. These conflicting results may be attributable to the
source of data. Jaszkowiak assessed overall perceptions from the government
construction management teams whereas this study’s data consists of QA deficiency
reports. This research did not analyze customer satisfaction of the project, which is a
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large factor in determining the final quality of a project (Baccarini, 1999; Lim &
Mohamed, 1999). Notwithstanding, this research suggests that heightened deficiencies or
poor quality work should not be a unique subject of focus for either contract type.
Reimbursable contracts are used in Afghanistan by the US government because of
the increased risk due to the security situation. As a result, it was expected that external
environmental factors would be more prevalent on reimbursable contracts. The use of this
contract type is justified because of the more austere or uncertain project environments.
However, there was no significant difference in delays due to any of the external
environmental factors. In fact, security incidents and other external environmental delays
(e.g. local interference) were reported more often in fixed-price contracts, though not
significantly. This result may suggest that risk assessments may not adequately assess the
security situation for both reimbursable and fixed-price projects. Additionally, the term
“high-risk” has a broad meaning. A project may have been high-risk simply due to being
in a remote location or due to the security situation. Additionally, some accessible
projects are classified as high-risk because of the undefined scope, or anticipation of
many change orders as the end-user firmed up requirements (Schoenenberger, 2014). As
the external environment was not a significant factor between contract types, these
findings may also suggest that the high-risk projects are characterized more by vague
project requirements than the environment.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Recommendation 1 – Find source of rework in Design Process.
As described in the discussion, the “failures” that most occurred with design
performance and contract management were wasteful rework and missed deadlines.
Previous research has shown that design rework problems can have a significant effect on
the overall schedule of construction projects (Li & Taylor, 2014). Furthermore,
Blomberg, et al. (2014) performed a case study on two near-identical projects to show
that internal policies and procedures can be a significant cause of cost increases. Other
research has shown that, in some cases, design review systems are often plagued by
inefficient processes. However, oftentimes the realignment of tasks and priorities
increases efficiency (Palaneeswaran, et al., 2014). Aside from being more aware of
possible design performance problems in fixed-price contracts, it may help construction
agents to perform lean analysis, or some kind of similar process improvement, of their
audit systems to ensure that inefficient reviewing or unnecessary requirements are not the
root-cause of rework for contract submittals.
Recommendation 2 – Scrutinize Tasks & Productivity in Reimbursable Projects.
For cost reimbursable projects, two metrics are critical to maintaining the
schedule: a progress measurement system and a productivity index (Nkuah, 2006). In
fixed-price contracts, individual line-items are not important to auditing the project.
However, in reimbursable projects, the ultimate cost of the project is a sum of all
individual costs – all of which require approval and review. Any task that finishes late
will require additional labor (and possibly material) than originally planned will, as a
result, increase the cost of the project. In order to minimize risk to the owner and remain
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informed of the exact progress of the project, construction agents should consider using a
system that measures incremental task progress and aids in the detailed inspection of
small line-items (Nkuah, 2006).
Quality assurance engineers should also have the ability to measure the labor
productivity for all project teams. After all, “the craft labor force is the major element
that affects the cost and schedule of a cost reimbursable project.” (Nkuah, 2006) The
primary metric for this is the productivity index, which is a ratio of the actual hours and
the planned hours. There are specific methods by which a QA engineer may assess the
productivity index for a contractor, and compare the metric to the original plan. When the
index is above one, then the project costs are greater than the planned amounts. This
helps the construction agent to forecast progress, as well as identify areas of the project to
scrutinize and address with the contractor. Finally, to ease the process and reduce labor of
inspection, the recommendation is to make the audit system simple and easy to
understand and implement (Nkuah, 2006).
A much more common method of measuring progress is by using earned value
forecasting. These methods have been shown to be applicable in post-project tracking.
Wauters and Vanhoucke (2014) used a Monte Carlo simulation to forecast cost and
schedule performance with the cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance
(SPI) index. Additionally, Kim and Reinschmidt (2011) developed a Bayesian framework
which used historical SPI and CPI data to forecast project cost and schedule performance.
Implementation of these methods may help construction agents accurately track and
control cost and schedule growth before it reaches an unredeemable level.
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Recommendation 3 – Consider all contract types to minimize costs to owner.
In a wartime construction environment, risk is a significant factor of concern for
both construction agents and firms. Previous research has already shown that the
perception of risk significantly affects both bidding behaviors and also ultimate behavior
of the contractor in response to significant changes in costs of completing the
requirements of the contract (Baron, 1972). In wartime environments, it is logical for a
construction agent to employ reimbursable contracts because of the low-risk the
contractor carries. According to Baron‘s results, reducing risk to contractors ought to
inspire motivation to bid, which increases the likelihood of a construction agent
accomplishing its mission. The increased risk in wartime environments demands a more
conservative construction model and an increase in flexibility. Reimbursable contracts
possess both of these attributes.
However, it may behoove wartime construction agents to consider other
construction models in order to minimize costs and waste to government. One uncommon
option for government construction is the incentive-based contract. Fixed price and
reimbursable incentive contracts are increasing in popularity in the private sector because
they are designed to reward good performance and penalize poor performance. No
additional action is required on the part of the owner (Veld & A, 1989). Previous research
has shown that contract type is not the only predictor of whether or not a contractor will
accept project risk. Price is also a factor. Previous research has used utility theory and
decision analysis to find breakpoints, for different levels of risk, where a contractor will
accept lump-sum prices over a cost-plus contract (Carr, 1977). Applying this model to
government contracts, or performing updated analysis in future research, may assist
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construction agents in selecting the most advantageous contract type in order to balance
the risk, cost, and schedule. Therefore, there are root causes and reasons that may lead to
the predictive factors. While the significant problems are indeed predictive, they may
only be symptoms of greater problems with the two contract types.
Limitations.
This study was limited to 25 projects, which limited the type of statistical tests
that could be used to perform analysis. Only non-parametric tests could be used, and
only those that are known to be compatible with small-sample size populations. Future
research should obtain a larger sample group (perhaps from USACE) which will increase
the number of analysis options. Another limitation was the depth of data retrieval from
the daily reports. The combined length of the daily reports was approximately 20,000
pages. Therefore, only major deficiencies were analyzed. However, there were many
other minor incidents recorded by the QA engineers. In-depth case study research on
smaller groups of these projects may provide further insight into performance differences
between contracts.
Concluding thoughts.
The purpose of this research is to provide construction agents, firms, and military
leaders alike with information that will help curb waste and aid strategic decisions
regarding future military construction and nation-building projects. All of these facts
underline the rapidly changing environment that is wartime construction, which has a
significant effect on the progress of a project. While the results imply that cost growth
and schedule growth seen in reimbursable contracts is greater than those of fixed-price
contracts, it would be irresponsible to assume that FFP contracts are more advantageous
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for the government to use in a wartime environment. There were specific reasons, usually
risk-oriented, that led the construction agent to use CPFF contracts, especially in the
initial stages of the Afghanistan reconstruction. Arguably, the use of CPFF may have
prevented default of contractors on more high-risk projects. Instead, the moral of this
paper is that owners need to be aware that reimbursable objects are likely to have more
cost and schedule growth. Owners and their agents need to take decisive steps as
described in the recommendations to minimize the growth and to reduce the overall
amount of waste.
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IV. Discussion
Chapter Overview
This chapter contains additional content relevant to the thesis topic, but
inappropriate for inclusion in the scholarly articles. The material on the methodology
contains background on contingency tables and their operation which may be helpful to
follow-on students. The further discussion contains more in-depth discussion on the
results of Kendall’s correlation test for scholarly Article 1. This information is most
relevant to the sponsor, but may also be useful for other students who are looking
establish discrete probability values for decision analysis use.
Methodology
The contingency tables will serve to answer the question of independence for cost
or schedule. Restated, the research question essentially asks, “Which are the factors – if
any – upon which cost and schedule are dependent?” Contingency tables use categorical
variables to sort occurrences of incidents, and then create marginal probabilities
(McClave, et al., 2011).
The input factors to be observed in the projects are considered categorical.
(Example: Concrete Quality Problems present versus not present.) The response variable
is ultimate schedule performance or cost performance (expressed as a “1” for positive
performance, and “0” for negative performance), which has already been divided into
qualitative categories. The response variable is the separation between FFP or CPFF
projects. A two-way contingency table will be created using every input variable from
Table 2. An example is shown in Table 16. Additionally, once the data is split in this
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way, a probability table will be developed, which will look similar to Table 16, except it
will contain probabilities that are calculated by dividing the original values by the total
number of data points.
Table 15 – Contingency Table Example
Response A Response B Totals
Input A

n11

n12

R1

Input B

n21

n22

R2

Totals

Cc1

Cc2

n

There are some basic requirements which must be met in order for the
contingency table to be used. The projects are independent in nature, have k possible
outcomes (or categories), and the probabilities of all k outcomes will subsequently add to
1. Contingency tables also require each cell to have a large sample size, which is n=5
(McClave, et al., 2011). The dataset meets this requirement for the given inputs. The
dataset is representative of the entire population of projects for the program being
researched. Therefore a random sample is not necessary. The data meet the requirements
to perform a multinomial contingency table experiment.
The experiment involves two different kinds of hypothesis test: the Chi-square
test and Fisher’s Exact Test. The Chi-square test is for when all cells are greater than 5 in
a 2x2 contingency table. The initial hypothesis will be there that projects which were
behind or ahead of schedule are independent of a given input. The test is performed using
the Χ2 test statistic. To find this value, the probabilities which correspond to the original
table are used to calculate an expected value for each cell, which are in turn used to
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calculate Χ2. After comparing the test statistic to the value of Χ2.05 we will determine
independence or dependence on the input attribute.
This thesis exclusively used Fisher’s exact test because all of the tables had at
least one cell which did not satisfy the n = 5 condition. The initial and alternative
hypothesis are the same for Fisher’s test as the Chi-Square test. The primary difference is
that Fisher’s exact test uses a hypergeometric-binomial combined distribution. The test is
an iterative method, which manipulates the given table from one extreme possibility to
another and results in a cumulative probability value (see Equation 1) which predicts the
likelihood of the contingency table distribution occurring comparing to other possible
combinations which could come from the sample population. Much like a normal p-value
calculation, the null hypothesis is rejected when the probability value is below 5%,
indicating dependence.
Equation 1 – Fisher's Exact Test

𝒑=

�𝒏𝟏𝟏𝒏+𝒏𝟏𝟐 � �𝒏𝟐𝟏𝒏+𝒏𝟐𝟐 �
𝟏𝟏

�𝒏

𝒏

𝟏𝟏 +𝒏𝟐𝟏

𝟐𝟏

�

=

(𝒏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒏𝟏𝟐 )! (𝒏𝟐𝟏 + 𝒏𝟐𝟐 )! (𝒏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒏𝟐𝟏 )! (𝒏𝟏𝟐 + 𝒏𝟐𝟐 )!
𝒏𝟏𝟏 ! ∗ 𝒏𝟏𝟐 ! ∗ 𝒏𝟐𝟏 ! ∗ 𝒏𝟐𝟐 ! ∗ 𝒏!

For the second article, the Mann-Whitney test used to compare performance

differences between reimbursable and fixed-price contracts (although one contingency
table comparison was used). This test was employed because it is known for being more
accurate when used in non-parametric situations (i.e. when distributions are not normally
distributed). Different than an f-test it employs a ranking system by comparing each point
of one dataset and observing how many points of the comparison population are below it.
A score is assigned to that data point. The sum of all of the score is the rank for that
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category. A test statistic is then calculated using the rank, the mean rank of that variable,
and the standard distribution of the individual rankings. This test statistic is then applied
to a normal distribution table to find a probability or p-value.
Additional Discussion of Results
The Appendix contains from additional results from the statistical software JMP®.
Primarily, the distributions were not displayed. Therefore, to provide additional insight
on how breakpoints were established for the contingency tables, the distributions are
made available in the appendix.
Interestingly, quality problems with the building foundation were significantly
correlated with many other deficiencies and external environmental issues. Most
significantly, projects that possessed foundation problems were also very likely to
possess project management (r = 0.6365, p = 0.0001) and contract management (r =
0.373, p = 0.025) problems as well .There was also association with increased safety
deficiencies (r = 0.4542, p = 0.006), poor horizontal work (r = 0.3985, p = 0.022). The
relationship with horizontal work is intuitive; both often involving concrete. But the
relationship with safety deficiencies is vague. Although it interesting to note that, of the
six projects sited to possess foundation problems, 5 were located in the Kabul region.
Many of the shop drawing and material submittal deficiencies were instances
where the construction team deviated from the original design. Many times, the
construction team declared the change technically acceptable and a retroactive design
change was accepted by the government. While these deficiencies may have ultimately
met the intent of the project, this issue suggests that there may be disagreement between
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the design engineers’ vision and the true capability of the construction team (whether it
be material availability or level of skill possessed by the labor force). These unnecessary
processes ultimately take attention away from the project by the staff, as well as the
quality assurance engineers, who have a due diligence to ensure that the project is built
according to the approved design. Time and effort could be saved if the construction team
coordinated with design staff to ensure the project is designed in such as way that it may
also be built in a wartime environment.
Electrical deficiencies were associated with an increase in contract modifications
(r = 0.41, p = 0.01) and also correlated with poor material and submittal incident rate
(r = 0.36, p < 0.05). The daily reports often cited electrical problems being the result of
installing improper or unapproved material, and thus required rework. AFCEC also
mentioned several instances where electrical work was the critical path line-item, and
required FPOP extensions – which necessitate contract modifications. Additionally, being
one of the more technical crafts of construction, the workers in a developing country like
Afghanistan often did not initially possess the skills necessary to complete the work,
which required training and additional time; another cause for a modification.
Nearly all of the crafts were correlated with safety deficiencies to some degree,
but reportable safety incidents had some more unique relationships. Structural had the
strongest relationship to deficiencies (r = 0.50, p < 0.01); it is noteworthy that falling and
being struck by objects are among the most common types of construction accidents
(OSHA, 2014). Safety incidents were also correlated to increase in external
environmental issues besides security incidents (r = 0.48, p < 0.01) and also associated
with increases in the awarded cost growth (r = 0.40, p < 0.05).
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Structural deficiencies were strongly correlated to project management problems
(r = 0.56, p < 0.001) and foundation deficiencies (r = 0.49, p < 0.01), as well as some
other crafts. Aside from the foundation, the structural portion of the work must usually be
completed before any further crafts can be begun. These results suggest that there may be
a “bottle-neck” in the structural discipline which can more significantly affect the final
cost of the project. It is also possible that larger, more costly, projects also have more
complex structural work, and therefore garner more scrutiny or challenges in the
structural discipline. There may also be a mediating relationship shown by the
relationship between project management and design performance (r = 0.32, p < 0.05).
Oddly, mechanical problems correlated positively with project budget
performance (r = 0.43, p < 0.05). Meaning that budget performance improved as
mechanical deficiencies increased. Follow-up contingency tables tests were performed to
see if this relationship could be explained. Mechanical showed to be very dependent on
structural quality (p < 0.05) and interior finishing quality (p < 0.01). These factors did not
explain the relationship to budget performance, but did confirm that interior finishing and
structural design are critical to the successful installation of mechanical systems. It is
possible that the correlation between budget performance was a coincidence of the data
due to the smaller sample size and should be discarded.
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V. Conclusion
Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a summary of the results and significance of the thesis.
There will be further discussion of future research that was not included in the scholarly
articles, a review of the research findings as found in the two scholarly articles, some
discussion on the significance of the research, and final concluding thoughts.
Review of Findings
The two scholarly articles analyzed 25 AFCEC projects to search for answers to
two research questions related to wartime construction projects, and their performance.
The findings from the two articles provide excellent insight into wartime construction and
also show the need for additional research on wartime construction projects, which will
be discussed in a later section.
The first research question asked, “Which factors affect the success of wartime
construction projects?” The results from the first article showed that allowed schedule
growth can predict budget performance. Additionally, when the construction agent gives
additional time for a contractor to complete a project, this may actually increase the
likelihood that a contractor will be late. Moreover, project management issues can be
predictive of schedule performance, and through interviews and background information
on project managers may improve future project performance. Finally, weather, security,
culture, and other external environmental factors were not predictive of budget or
schedule performance.
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The second question investigated how wartime project outcomes differ based on
the contract type (fixed-price or reimbursable). The results showed that reimbursable
contracts take longer to complete and cost more than fixed price contracts. Fixed price
contracts are more often plagued by design performance and contract management
problems. However, the study found that there was no significant difference in
construction deficiency occurrences. Additionally, there was no different in security or
external environmental delays, which may be insightful for future contracts, given that
reimbursable contracts were used because of increased project risk factors.
Significance of Research
Wartime construction is an inherent activity in a nation-building effort, and it is
likely that there will be a similar effort from the United States and coalition partners in
future conflicts. It would be helpful for construction agents to manage a knowledge
database which captures and distributes the lessons that can be learned from mistakes and
successes of past wartime projects. However, if these lessons are not captured, the risk or
repeating past mistakes will only be higher. This thesis addresses a small part of this
knowledge base, and also serves to once again open discussion on the topic of wartime
construction in the world of academia. It reminds construction agents that project
management is a crucial function of a project to scrutinize. Additionally, budget auditing
measures should be meticulously maintained by construction agents to control cost
growth. Also, there are significant performance differences between fixed-price and
reimbursable contracts, and there may be other suitable contract models – particularly
with incentives – that would control cost and schedule growth in future projects. There
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are many other opportunities for future research in wartime construction and continued
knowledge-gathering is vital to the future success of all DoD construction agents.
Additional Future Research
This study focused on projects that were completely nation-building in purpose,
which differed greatly from the conventional mission of AFCEC and USACE, which
usually construct projects solely for US government use. Many of these government-used
projects are still located outside of the United States; some are in war zones and some are
not. A comparison of this program to government-used programs may reveal some key
differences between how foreign, federal projects perform versus projects foreign
projects that are designed for host-nation development. In the event that another longterm nation-building effort is attempted by the United States and its allies, this
comparison data may be useful in further discerning unique challenges to executing
nation-building projects in a contingency environment.
As shown by the literature review, one of the most common ways to search for
primary causes of delay is by surveying construction professionals. This survey data is
made stronger when compared with quantitative data. A survey could be developed to
interview a mix of individuals who worked on this research program. AFCEC staff,
quality assurance engineers, NTM-A staff, Prime Contractors, and even sub-contractors
could be surveyed to find root causes of delays, quality problems, and cost overruns.
Interviews could also be used, and combined with qualitative coding software, such as
Atlas TI®. Many of these construction professionals are still tied to the program, but as
the effort in Afghanistan comes to a close, they are moving to other jobs. Time is of the
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essence to ensure that lessons from these subject matter experts can be captured in a
useful way.
Part of the data collection for this effort included the extensive schedules that are
produced for larger projects. There were also many updates for each schedule between
the beginning and end of each project. For this research, only minimal data was pulled
from the schedules. There remains many additional insights into schedule execution that
could be useful for the government in future efforts. A more expansive study (perhaps
with a group) would be the comparison of the scheduled work to be completed with the
daily reports and quantity of work actually completed. This would provide detailed
earned value data, which may sometimes be different than that of the contractor-supplied
cost and schedule data – due to the optimistic presentation often given by contractors
when presenting their progress.
Due to the vast amount of documentation that needed to be reviewed for the datamining in this research, only major deficiencies were coded for the contingency table
analysis. However, case-studies could be performed for each individual project, or a
small group of projects, which would allow for more detailed coding and root-cause
analysis. There are several large projects (~$100 Million) that would be excellent
candidates for this type of research, due to the diverse collection of challenges
experienced.
A regression model of a larger sample-size of Afghanistan projects could provide
useful data comparison across AFCEC and USACE projects. It would allow for broader
factors and differences to be analyzed for the entire country-building program.
Additionally, comparison of the Afghanistan program to the Iraq program may also be
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useful in order to include multiple nation-building efforts. Ultimately, this type of
research would emphasize the analysis of project metadata, such as location, general size,
contract execution method or agent, mission purpose, owner, year of construction, and
other similar factors. This may provide high-level decision-makers key information when
making decisions about how a large program should be managed.
Quantifying the external environment was a difficult task of this research, and
there remains much research to be done on this issue. Originally, the research included
external environmental factors in order find whether or not these issues were indicative of
overall performance or craft performance problems. This research can draw no such
inferences because there were no significant relationships. Weather was the only external
environmental issue that directly correlated with any other factors, and these relationships
were not easily explained. Regarding security: every craft – with the exception of
mechanical – correlated with security incidents. There wasn’t any reasonable explanation
for these correlations. A third scholarly article was begun to perform root-cause analysis
on external environmental factors. Unfortunately, the researching student did not have
enough time to perform the analysis for this article. Should a future student want to
continue this effort, the data is readily available.
AFCEC also believes that the 365 POP, which is primarily end-user-driven, has a
negative effect on the project schedule performance. Although, in this thesis, if a
schedule extension was justified, a project was not necessarily considered behind,
AFCEC believes that projects were thwarted by setting unrealistic schedules, and then
inevitably forced to adjust. The effort required to reorganize and redistribute resources
may have negatively affected a contractor when setting realistic schedules at the onset of
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a project may not have had such a poor effect. Future research could compare NTM-A
project to MILCON projects that were programmed by coalition customers. These
MILCON projects did not require a strict 365 schedule. Rather they maintained more
flexibility. Contractors for these projects rarely went over-schedule. It would be
interesting to identify any performance differences between these types of projects.
This research may have unintentionally answered the question, “What effect does
a quality assurance program have on a construction project.” AFCEC was very stringent
regarding the use of a QA engineer on all sites, which often created additional
complications and expenses for the NTM-A officials, due to the logistics of having a
third-party contractor on-site to inspect all activities, and ensuring their personal safety.
Conversely, USACE did not use QA engineers on many of their NTM-A projects and
were also forced to terminate many projects for contractor default. (AFCEC only had one
termination for default.) There was no research done in this thesis to compare
performance of project that used QA engineers versus those that did not. However, the
results of this research were dependent on the observations of the quality assurance
engineers; and the logical results should validate that the QA engineers were adequately
performing their duties and may have also been associated with positive performance of
project. The correlation tests reflect strong relationships between deficiencies and the
ultimate budget and schedule performance of the projects. Further research should be
done to affirm whether or not quality assurance engineers actually reduce the risk in
contingency construction projects, as this research suggests.
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Summary
This research explored performance factors that predicted performance and found
performance differences between contract types. The purpose of this research was to
understand wartime construction as it differs from peacetime construction, and how
AFCEC executes an innovative and unique construction program with an very low
contractor default record. The research methodology used 25 AFCEC-Afganistan projects
for an in-depth review of project schedules and schedule updates, invoicing and earnedvalue data, and thousands of daily project reports. The data were used to perform
contingency table predictions, correlations, and pairwise median comparisons. This
investigation shows that owner oversight may be the single most critical aspect to
effectively controlling cost and schedule overruns in wartime projects. Additionally, it
also shows that there are significant performance differences between reimbursable and
fixed-price contracts in both cost and schedule, and virtually none in craft performance or
delays from the external environment. Future recommendations are to ensure detailed
cost controls, limit schedule extensions, reevaluate the design review process to eliminate
wasted effort, develop detailed quality assurance programs that can track detailed
progress levels, scrutinize and review all project managers, and consider incentive
contracts to balance risk between owner and contractor. Overall, the analysis identifies
ways to anticipate poor performance respond with improved methods to manage these
wartime projects.
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Appendix
Distributions used to determine breakpoints
Award Amount (AFCEC) 1
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25.0%
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0.0%

maximum
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minimum
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1.7e+7
1.27e+7
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1201753
1201753

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N
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Final Cost (AFCEC) 2

0

20000000

60000000

100000000

78

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum
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minimum

1.07e+8
1.07e+8
1.07e+8
9.42e+7
3.56e+7
2.39e+7
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5577743
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1552538
1552538

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
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N
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21362156
25

Awarded Cost Growth (Index) 3
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N
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Number of Contract Modifications (AFCEC/DR) 5
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Summary Statistics
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Summary Statistics
Mean
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Initial Period of Performance (AFCEC/DR) 7
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Final Period of Performance (AFCEC/DR) 8
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Awarded Schedule Growth (Index) 9

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

82

Quantiles
100.0%
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